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 Abstract 
The current rise in nationalist sentiments and emphasis on developing immigration 
policies around the world led to the question of how have attitudes towards immigration and 
non-native people affected the differences in economic growth across post-communist countries 
in the Central and Eastern Europe regions? Using survey data from two waves of the World 
Value Survey as well as quantitative control data and proxy variables, this study contradicts 
expectations based on current literature in that it shows how negative attitudes towards others are 
correlated with higher growth. Such results demonstrate what could be a recurring phenomenon 
for countries in transition. However, the possibilities of inaccurate survey responses and data 
limitations due to survey inconsistencies must be kept in mind. The following research is not an 
all-encompassing answer to the aforementioned question. Instead, it illustrates a divergence from 
current literature and demonstrates a need for continuous investigation into how personal values 
are affecting nations as a whole. 
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 Introduction 
Post-communist countries, also referred to as countries in transition or Second World 
countries, occupy a distinct yet simultaneously similar position compared to developed, First 
World, and developing, Third World, countries. They are nearly equal to Third World countries 
in terms of their percent of the world’s gross national product, nineteen percent compared to 
eighteen percent; they are almost the same as First World countries in terms of percent of world 
area, twenty-six percent compared to twenty-three percent; and they are precisely between First 
and Third World countries in terms of percent of the world population, thirty-three compared to 
fifteen and fifty-two percent, respectively (Hague, Harrop, and Breslin 1992, as cited in Ma 
1998). Because of how transitioning post-communist nations can be equated to other countries in 
different ways, yet stand out due to their own tumultuous history, they provide unique data for 
research as well as applicable results on a wide range of topics.  
In my research, I analyze post-communist countries and the topic of immigration. More 
specifically, I work toward answering the question: to what degree, if at all, have attitudes 
towards immigration and non-native people affected the differences in economic growth across 
post-communist countries in the Central and Eastern Europe regions? Intuitively, I would think 
that greater openness and acceptance would result in greater economic growth following the fall 
of communist regimes. Therefore, I posit the null hypothesis that on average, there is no effect 
between post-communist European countries’ growth since the end of the 20th century and the 
attitudes of each countries’ native population towards migrants and foreign workers. On the other 
hand, my alternative hypothesis is that on average, there is an effect between attitudes and 
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 economic growth; furthermore, the post-communist European countries that have experienced 
greater, positive economic growth since the end of the 20th century contain a native population 
that has relatively more positive attitudes and beliefs towards migrants and foreign workers.  
By focusing on survey results from waves, or rounds of data collection, three 
(1995-1998) and five (2005-2009) of the World Value Survey (WVS), I am able to find 
quantified data on personal opinions. The immigration and foreign worker-related survey 
responses range in concerns from how welcoming people think their nation’s immigration policy 
should be to whether or not individuals would fight in a war in support of their country. These 
responses, as well as other survey results and control factors outlined below, not only illustrate 
the sentiments and performance of countries in transition but also serve as cases of precedent as 
nations and governments continuously evolve around the world. 
What is most notable about my study is that after an initial regression analysis, I fail to 
reject the null hypothesis in a cross-sectional analysis using wave three data (1995-1998), in a 
panel data set analysis using a combination of wave three data and wave five data (2005-2009), 
and in a reduced-sample size data set using wave three data again. The coefficient on the variable 
that reflects the most significant survey variables, Attitude, resulted in regression outputs where 
as attitudes become more positive (an increase in individuals willing to have an open 
immigration policy and a decrease in dislike for having an immigrant or foreign worker as a 
neighbor), the gross domestic product per capita grew slower than in those countries where 
attitudes were negative. It is important to note that I assume in this study that WVS responses are 
accurate and that people tell the truth in surveys asking about personal beliefs, despite the 
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 possibility that people may not accurately assess or honestly respond to the survey questions. 
Nevertheless, my results run counter to initial intuition and reviewed literature. 
Additionally, the results lack power in the panel and second cross section data sets. While 
this lack of robustness does not allow for unquestionably strong statistical evidence, the fact that 
the coefficient directions and magnitudes do align validates the results. Through the following 
research and analysis, one can see how personal beliefs and values held on average in a 
post-communist European nation affect their nation’s economic growth and productivity. 
The following literature review will look at the widespread research already done on how 
values and trust in general are connected to economic outcomes. The papers I reference highlight 
the importance of countries in transition as research subjects, how industrialization connects to 
value shifts and therefore economic growth, how trust as an exogenous factor in economic 
growth maintains robustness in quantitative studies, and the effects of immigration on 
economies.  
The current literature written on beliefs and values within a population analyzes a variety 
of subjects ranging from trust to business ethics to religion and more. Unlike these papers, my 
study will explore attitudes through a more narrow lense by looking strictly at survey data and 
value systems pertaining to immigration and foreign workers. By doing so, I seek to connect 
with the today’s international interest in migrants. Additionally, there are other papers that focus 
on immigration, but look at immigration trends using ex-post statistics whereas I use ex-ante 
attitudes on immigrants to forecast future economic outcomes. This intersection of immigration 
beliefs and economic outcomes therefore adds to today’s literature and provides a new 
perspective for the ongoing conversations regarding immigration. The papers discussed below 
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 have helped to shape and guide my research as I aim to uncover if and how the effects of 
personal survey responses create a national set of beliefs that influence economic growth in a 
lagged, time-oriented framework. 
Literature Review 
Post-communist European countries provide an optimal pool from which to gather data 
and perform studies because of their state of transition and continuing development from a 
command economy to a market economy. As Jan Fidrmuc (2001) indicates in his analysis of 
economic reform and democracy, studying countries in transition is as if one is conducting a 
controlled experiment. This control-like situation is useful because of the clear cause and effect 
analysis that can be drawn from the data, which can then be applied to studying other 
transitioning or developing nations. Because these nations are so newly formed, this reasoning 
can be applied to my study on attitudes towards immigration and trust in the post-communist 
region of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 The paper “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values” 
has strongly influenced the direction of my research as well as the collection of publications on 
culture and how a society’s values play a role in economic development. In this paper, Ronald 
Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker (2000) use WVS data to show that countries around the world 
tend to hold certain values and lean in one direction over another in terms of beliefs. When a 
country has a very clear perspective on a value, such a belief tends to remain prevalent despite 
other changes taking place within the nation’s borders (Inglehart and Baker 2000). However, 
depending on the degree to which a country is industrialized, the nation is likely to be associated 
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 with either traditional or secular-rational values and survival or self-expression values (Inglehart 
and Baker 2000). Subsequently, the shift from being a pre-industrial to post-industrial society 
causes major changes, often pushing a country from being more traditionalist to more secular, for 
example being more religious and respectful of authority to being more skeptical and conscious 
of personal economic and physical security (Inglehart and Baker 2000). The two authors find 
that the more industrialized, secular, and self-expressionist a country is, the higher its gross 
national product is; in other words, places where people report higher levels of well-being, trust, 
tolerance, gender equality, and environmental and political activism have more prosperous 
economies (Inglehart and Baker 2000).  
In Inglehart and Baker’s study (2000), country-specific values influence how each nation 
particularly evolves and how well the society progresses economically compared to the others. 
Inglehart and Baker (2000) include in their results a graph that illustrates where the studied 
countries fall in terms of survival versus self-expression values, as well as traditional versus 
secular values. One can see that on this graph, Figure 1 in the publication of  “Modernization, 
Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values” (not shown here), the 
post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe are plotted in the same general area, 
but do not fall in exactly the same place. Therefore, attitude-based data, such as country-specific 
degrees of hostility and openness, provide valuable and varied information for studying the more 
narrow focus of attitudes towards immigration particularly when using WVS responses. 
 Additionally, the gross domestic products of post-communist countries have grown at 
different rates after the fall of communism (Katchanovski 2000). Katchanovski (2000) explains 
that this phenomenon can be partially attributed to how the level of ethnic and linguistic 
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 similarity among a country’s residents decreases transaction costs, lessens conflicts, and supports 
a single nation, which in turn increases economic modernization. This piece of literature 
provides significant motivation for studying the effects of attitudes towards immigration in the 
development of post-communist European countries since it succeeded in finding that cultural 
values have influenced this region’s growth. Katchanovski (2000) looks at multiple cultural 
values: religion, business ethics, trust, civil society (meaning non-family and non-government 
networks), and historical experience, to name a few. However, this study touches upon a broad 
range of cultural aspects and faces a multicollinearity problem, which makes differentiating 
between impacts of different cultural values difficult (Katchanovski 2000). Rather than having a 
wide-ranging collection of values, studying the impact of values and opinions regarding 
immigration narrows the number of directions in which the study points, therefore avoiding 
confusion regarding high levels of correlation between religion or historical experience and 
Western culture variables (Katchanovski 2000). Furthermore, Katchanovski (2000) cites and 
highlights research by Fukuyama (1995) when he notes that trust is an important aspect of a 
culture’s characteristics, and that trust allows for openness to economic exchange outside of 
immediate family and friends, which therefore allows for greater business opportunities and 
fewer uncertain relationships. 
 Trust as an indicator of economic growth continues to be relevant in economic research 
as shown by Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, Henri L.F. de Groot, and Anton B.T.M. van Schaik (2004). 
Their research proves that studies by both Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001), 
who each use trust as an exogenous variable that factors into economic growth, provided 
analyses that were robust – statistically significant – enough to be valid. The research shows that 
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 data limitations, not omitted variable bias, are more of a concern when studying trust as an 
economic growth indicator (Beugelsdijk et al. 2004). After testing four dimensions of the 1997 
and 2001 studies on various countries’ development, this literature demonstrates that trust is 
statistically significant in 99.9% of cases, the choice of conditioning variables is insignificant in 
terms of the relationship between trust and growth, the effect of trust on growth remains robust 
after other exogenous variables are switched to different yet similar variables, and adding more 
countries to the study (as Zak and Knack (2001) did to Knack and Keefer (1997)) increased the 
effect size and significance of trust as an economic growth determinant. Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) 
demonstrate that trust is a valid variable in which to base a study, and the fact that the robustness 
of prior research became more evident when including less-trusting countries provides support 
for using beliefs-based variables in studies on Europe’s post-communist region, since this area 
has been found to tend towards survivalist, more skeptical, perspectives over self-expressionist 
values (Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) also add to the literature that strongly demonstrates 
how culture has a significant impact on economic outcomes. Their studies look specifically at 
how beliefs shape international trade and investments, and find that trust has a positive and 
significant effect on trade (Guiso et al. 2004), which motivates research into how trust and 
attitudes regarding immigration may also significantly affect GDP per capita outcomes. While 
Guiso et al. (2004) point out that there may be reverse causality so that trade leads to trust among 
foreign nations and although they did not find any conclusions or significant results on welfare, 
the overall findings reveal that distrust results in first order economic losses over time and that 
culture, trust, and economics are intertwined. Therefore, my research into how tolerance and 
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 values regarding individuals coming into and going out of specific countries will add to the 
findings of Guiso et al (2004). 
 Literature by Mikk Titma and Denis Trapido (2002) supports previous evidence of 
differences among post-communist countries’ levels of success. The authors note that since 
nations in this region are no longer under command economies, employees must now compete 
with each other (Titma and Trapido 2002). This is an important change since it means that those 
native to a post-communist country must compete with immigrants, and this competition may 
affect attitudes towards immigration as a whole and have detrimental economic consequences. 
 Despite the many sources proving how culture impacts economies, others have found that 
economic outcomes influence behavior and opinions. According to a study by Rafaela M. 
Dancygier and Michael J. Donnelly (2012), the health of an economy may change how people 
native to a country view the immigrant population and policies concerning non-EU migrants. 
Dancygier and Donnelly’s paper turns away from many of the other current pieces of literature 
by showing that depending on how a specific sector is doing, the industry’s economic well-being 
influences openness towards immigrants entering the nation and workforce. The research also 
shows how employment in growing sectors leads to positive opinions of migrant workers 
because growing industries increase workers’ feelings of job security and therefore willingness 
to accept more immigrant workers in order to continue growing the sector (Dancygier and 
Donnelly 2012). However, the opposite effect occurs among sectors not doing well. While these 
findings support reasoning for reverse causality, it also supports the literature by showing that 
there does exist a connection between immigration and growth. Furthermore, the breadth of 
findings outside of Dancygier and Donnelly’s paper for how culture influences economies 
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 motivates research into attitudes towards immigration in the development of post-communist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 Additionally, Ingrid Kubin and Peter Rosner (2002) find that immigration and how 
immigrants often times increase the quantity of low skill workers change how an economy runs. 
Due to discrimination and the need for immigrant skills to be transformed before being efficient 
in a new country, immigrants often flood the low-skill job market and drive down wages (Kubin 
and Rosner 2002). While this literature shows how immigration can affect wages in low-skill 
industries, these new employees complement the high-skill workers who rely on low-skill labor, 
therefore making the high-skill workers better off and driving greater income inequality (Kubin 
and Rosner 2002). While this study does not show how attitudes towards immigration affect the 
economy, the research into how immigrants shift the labor market provides reasoning other than 
prejudice for why natives may or may not look kindly upon incoming migrants. 
In the paper “The Effect of Immigration on Output Mix, Capital, and Productivity,” 
authors Myriam Quispe-Agnoli and Madeline Zavodny study how changes in labor supply 
because of immigration may affect changes in the U.S. manufacturing industry’s output, capital, 
and productivity. Results on productivity in particular indicate that immigration changes slow 
down productivity for both high- and low-skilled sectors (Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny 2002). 
Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny attribute this slowness to how assimilation takes time and long-term 
effects require additional research (Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny 2002). Although the study 
explores this effect using U.S. states as observations, not countries, it is still a valuable as it 
emphasizes small, closely connected economies, much like the clustered post-communist nations 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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  Finally, as noted earlier, Fidrmuc (2001) highlights the fact that studying post-communist 
countries is, in some ways, as if one is looking at a controlled experiment. Because decisions are 
being made by emerging nations with little to no prior precedent by their own government, these 
countries allow for a clear cause and effect analysis on a topic such as attitudes towards 
immigration. Additionally, findings related to transitioning countries are important for seeing 
how such countries may progress, but also for indicating how underdeveloped countries may 
progress in the future (Fidrmuc 2001). A study looking particularly at how attitudes towards 
immigration have caused differences in economic outcomes among post-communist countries 
adds to the existing literature on culture, values, immigration, and countries in transition – 
bringing these concepts together to analyze factors in a specific area during a time of migrant 
crises and many nationalist movements. 
Methodology: Cross Section One 
Studying people’s attitudes regarding a specific topic requires data that reflect individual 
opinions. For this reason, the following research uses mostly survey data, and specifically WVS 
data from waves three and five, which are collections of results gathered from 1995 to 1998 and 
2005 to 2009, respectively, in over fifty present-day countries, East Germany, West Germany, 
and Puerto Rico. For this study, I selected the Central and Eastern European countries that had 
previously been under communist regimes (as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which 
have been considered European and Asian in different contexts). The exact set of countries 
surveyed and the number of responses from each country vary: most range from 1,000 to 2,000 
individual responses per country, though Moldova and Ukraine are the extremes at 984 and 
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 2,811 responses, respectively (Inglehart et al. 2014).  I use additional economic and empirical 
data for control and possible causal analysis purposes.  
To test how attitudes towards immigration have affected growth in post-communist 
Europe, this study uses the change in logged values for gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
between 1998 and 2015 (logGDPpcPeriod) as the outcome variable in an individually 
constructed cross-sectional data set. Equation 1 below illustrates how this variable was created 
after gathering the GDP per capita values from the World Bank Databank database and 
converting the data to their log form. 
 
1) ogGDP pcP eriod log(GDP pc2015) log(GDP pc1998)l =  −   
 
I focus on these years, 1998 and 2015, because 1998 is the year in which the WVS results 
from wave three were finished being gathered as well as a year following all communist regimes 
and significant periods of violence in the region being studied. On the other end of the time 
period, 2015 is a very recent year for which sources have published data that can be compared to 
data both under communism and directly following communist regimes. 
After defining the period of interest and determining the outcome variable, I gather 
specific exogenous variables and build a full data set. Each wave of the WVS, completed by 
thousands of individuals around the world, includes many questions that result in answers used 
as exogenous variable values. Such values are along the same lines as the exogenous factors used 
in the previously described literature. These factors include if surveyed respondents highlight 
tolerance for others as an important quality to instill in children (ChildTol), would prefer not to 
15 
 have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors and believe the government should allow 
anyone to enter their country who wants to (two belief measurements that are combined in this 
study to create the variable called Attitude), prefer that available jobs go to people of that 
country’s nationality during times of high unemployment (JobsToCitizens), and would be willing 
to fight in a war for their country if necessary (War). 
I also included control variables that come from non-survey sources. The percent of each 
country’s population over the age of forty in 1998 is used as the first control (Senior). These 
World Data Bank-based figures account for a trend described by Inglehart and Baker (2000), 
which is that younger generations in twentieth century industrial societies differ from older 
generations in terms of survivalist attitudes. The younger the generation is, the greater their sense 
of security and the less appreciative they are for their life (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Because 
older individuals demonstrate a more survivalist perspective, including the percent of each 
country’s population older than forty accounts for the fact that having more adults and elderly 
people would increase the presence of survival-oriented views. In turn, this may cause them to 
see immigrants and foreign workers as invaders and then lead to detrimental economic outcomes 
in GDP per capita.  
In addition to population statistics as controls, I analyze the log of the GDP per capita in 
1998 (logGDP1998). By extracting this data from the World Bank Databank and including it in 
my analysis, the results account for and consider how convergence might be the reason for 
successful growth. If convergence theory holds, one expects that lower GDP per capita levels in 
1998 would result in comparatively faster growth by the end of the 1998 - 2015 period studied 
here. However, higher values of logGDP1998 that correspond with greater growth throughout 
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 the period would be misaligned with convergence theory. This is an important control factor for 
studying attitudes towards immigration and growth because takes into consideration the forces of 
the catch-up effect on developing countries. 
A third non-survey control included is the accumulation of gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCFGDP9815) for the period 1998 through 2015. For this indicator, the World Bank 
Databank includes a range of infrastructure improvements such as those to fences, drains, roads, 
railways, schools, hospitals, machinery, plants, residences, and more. Including this variable in 
the cross-sectional analysis requires calculating the sum of gross fixed capital formation for 1999 
- 2015 as shown in equation 2.  
 
2) F CF  x = ∑
2015
t=1999
G t  
 
Through GFCF, I evaluate how a nation’s investment in capital may lead to GDP per 
capita growth in the future. This is an important control since it takes into consideration the fact 
that transitioning countries, having in many cases recently fought in dissolution wars, build fixed 
capital quickly.  
In addition to the survey and control variables, this study includes the percent of GDP 
comprised of foreign asset stocks (FDI), which can be considered a proxy for Attitude. To 
calculate this exogenous variable, I divide each nation’s 1998 foreign asset stock by its 1998 
GDP and recording it as a percentage. Input values come from data gathered by Trinity College 
Dublin economist Philip Lane. The intuition behind using FDI was that a country is less likely to 
have savings abroad if citizens have negative attitudes towards foreigners, therefore more 
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 investments equals more positive feelings. As an independent variable, FDI’s percent of GDP 
takes into consideration actual expenditure as a representation of beliefs, which connects to a 
nation’s overall expenditure and GDP, and therefore the GDP per capita used here. 
Lastly, this study uses the role of net official development assistance and official aid 
received (ODA) from 1998, measured in current U.S. dollars, as a way to account for countries’ 
willingness to support people of other nations. I gather these non-survey values using the World 
Bank Databank and demonstrate how aiding others could influence a country’s economic 
well-being. Like FDI, ODA is used as a proxy variable for Attitude and is tested as an objective 
measure of beliefs in addition to the subjective survey responses. The thought process behind 
this variable is that a nation with more positive attitudes towards others would most likely give 
more in foreign aid. Therefore, one would expect this coefficient to be positive and significant - 
accounting for how helping others has domestic benefits. 
I consider many other variables and possibly causal factors given the literature reviewed 
and intuitive thought, such as education, the change in the number of migrants, the belief that 
most people can be trusted, and more. However, these and other factors and controls proved to 
be statistically insignificant and not considered moving forward. 
With two main categories of data, survey variables and non-survey controls, the 
following basic cross-sectional regression equation was created based on those variables that 
were most significant in literature and through statistical software. 
 
3a) logGDPpcPeriod = ⍺ + 𝛃​1​(ChildTol) + 𝛃​2​(Attitude) +𝛃 ​3​(JobsToCitizens) + 
𝛃​4​(Senior)+ 𝛃​5​(logGDP1998) +𝛃 ​6​(GCFCGDP9815) + 𝜺 
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4a) logGDPpcPeriod  = ⍺ + 𝛃​1​(Attitude) + 𝛃​2​(logGDP1998) + 𝛃 ​3​(GCFCGDP9815) + 𝜺 
 
Out of the six variables used in equation 3a, the most significant survey variable in terms 
of affecting the change in GDP per capita from 1998 to 2015 is Attitude, so I use this and the 
most significant control variables for additional analysis, as seen in equation 4a above. 
Following these two regressions, I use the proxy variables FDI and ODA instead of Attitudes to 
see if the effect is comparable. Equations 3b and 4b represents the change to proxy variables 
rather than the principal exogenous variable, Attitude. The same process was used twice: once 
with FDI and once with ODA. 
 
3b) logGDPpcPeriod = ⍺ + 𝛃​1​(ChildTol) + 𝛃​2​(FDI) + 𝛃​3​(JobsToCitizens) + 𝛃​4​(Senior)+ 
𝛃​5​(logGDP1998) +𝛃​6​(GCFCGDP9815) + 𝜺 
 
4b) logGDPpcPeriod  = ⍺ + 𝛃​1​(FDI) + 𝛃​2​(logGDP1998) + 𝛃 ​3​(GCFCGDP9815) + 𝜺 
 
Following these approaches, I run the same regressions, but change the growth rate 
variables to average annual growth rates. Specifically, I divide the logGDPpcPeriod and 
GFCFGDP9815 (and the change in net migration between 1998 and 2015, which got dropped 
because if its insignificance) by seventeen, which is the length of the period of interest. By 
making this change to the data, I aim to see how mean year-to-year changes play a role in this 
research question. 
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 By looking at individual significance levels and comparing coefficient signs and 
magnitudes, I am able to make connections and come closer to answering the question: to what 
degree, if at all, have attitudes towards immigration and non-native people affected the 
differences in economic growth across post-communist countries in the combined Central and 
Eastern Europe region? 
Results and Discussion: Cross Section One 
After running preliminary regressions, the most significant survey variable is Attitude, 
which combines survey results for the percent of participants who did not respond saying that 
they would not want an immigrant or foreign worker as a neighbor and the percent of 
participants who said that their country’s immigration policy should allow anyone who wants to 
come into the country to enter. According to the Stata output, Attitude has a negative coefficient 
of -0.0132539 and t-statistic of -2.49, which supports evidence of it being a strong coefficient. 
Figure 1 in the Appendix illustrates this significance as well as the results for the other variables 
in equation 3a. According to the Stata output, ​ceteris​ ​paribus​, Attitude shows that as a country’s 
individuals reported being more open to having immigrant neighbors and willing to let them 
enter the country during the 1995 to 1998 survey period, their nation’s GDP per capita grew 
more slowly relative to others. This outcome runs counterintuitively to initial expectations 
formed by literature and intuition.  
Another significant variable is Senior. This independent variable appears highly 
significant compared to the set of exogenous variables included in this initial regression. With a 
t-statistic of -2.65 and p-value of 0.018 in the first regression, Senior, the percent of each 
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 country’s population over the age of forty in 1998, expresses that all else equal, a nation 
containing a comparatively older population in 1998 saw slower growth throughout the 1998 to 
2015 period. Potential explanations may be that older workers are less productive due to 
ailments, greater physical inabilities, or more widespread retirement. However, Inglehart and 
Baker’s research on survivalist versus traditionalist mentalities supports the possibility that 
post-communist countries with higher levels of people over age forty experience slower growth 
in terms of GDP per capita due to their perspective that foreigners are detrimental to their nation 
and should not be trusted. While this result supports the current literature in which positive 
attitudes lead to greater growth, it contradicts this study and the Attitude variable, which show 
that negative attitudes lead to greater growth. In additional regression trials with a more selective 
set of variables, Senior becomes insignificant and is later dropped from the core set of exogenous 
factors, thus eliminating concern for this contradiction. 
The log of GDP per capita in 1998 is another exogenous variable that is relatively 
correlated with the endogenous variable, and illustrates that the greater one’s GDP per capita was 
in 1998, the less it grew between then and 2015. Not only does this comparable significance 
support convergence theory, in which less developed countries grow more quickly than 
developed countries among the twenty-two post-communist countries of interest, but it also 
indicates that both quantitative factors as well as qualitative factors like beliefs are influencing 
GDP per capita outputs in this region.  
Gross fixed capital formation was surprisingly less significant in this regression than 
anticipated. By examining equation 3a and the corresponding Stata results, one sees that there are 
many exogenous variables being considered and there is an apparent difference between 
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 R-squared and adjusted R-squared. Therefore equation 4a and other trials are important for 
further investigating the impact of attitudes towards immigration on economic growth in 
post-communist countries.  
I then narrowed the pool of exogenous variables to only the most significant and relevant. 
As indicated in Figure 2, Attitude remains significant and negative, GDP per capita in 1998 is 
much more statistically significant, but the gross fixed capital formation fails to remain 
noteworthy. The coefficient on Attitude supports the previous regression findings, though 
additional analysis will determine whether these output values are reliable.  
When I ran the regressions shown by equations 3b and 4b, which uses FDI as a proxy for 
Attitudes, as well as the ODA versions to investigate the possibly comparable effect using a 
proxy variable, the results were not tremendously similar. The t-statistics for FDI and ODA both 
have an absolute value of around 0.5 and the p-values are 0.575 and 0.622, respectively, for the 
first of the two regression models. When the regressions are run again for each proxy, this time 
with fewer exogenous variables, the power of FDI weakens and that of ODA is nearly identical. 
Therefore, using FDI or ODA as a proxy for Attitudes is not relevant to the understanding of 
attitudes towards immigration being a causal factor in the different changes in economics growth 
among post-communist countries in the Central and Eastern European region. For full regression 
outputs using FDI and ODA, see Figures 3 and 4.  
While the use of proxy variables did not prove to be statistically significant, as illustrated 
by the results from replacing Attitudes with FDI and then ODA, using Attitudes instead still 
demonstrates a viable correlation. Because the emphasis of this study is on personal beliefs and 
their specific effect on economic growth, using a proxy that is more representative of 
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 governmental decision-making may have caused the discrepancy between the various first 
cross-sectional outcomes. Rather than GDP per capita resulting directly from actual, enforced 
foreign policy and opinions, for which FDI and ODA serve as proxies, the outcomes found in 
this study support the argument that economic outcomes can be forecasted through prior attitudes 
and beliefs. 
Turning to the same regressions, but this time using average annual growth rates for the 
endogenous variable, GDP per capita, as well as gross fixed capital formation, I find results 
similar to the ones before: all else equal, as attitudes towards immigrants and foreign workers 
become more negative, economic productivity increases in post-communist countries in Eastern 
and Central Europe. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate this outcome and in the latter, the results show that 
all else equal, a 1% increase in the number of citizens who have positive attitudes towards 
immigrants and foreign workers (and who respond to the WVS) leads to a 0.06882% decrease in 
GDP per capita per year. Furthermore, given the standard deviation for Attitude, I find that the 
effect on average annual GDP growth from a one standard deviation change in Attitudes results 
in a significant 39.39 basis point decrease in GDP per capita per year. This calculation supports 
that there exists a connection between values and economic growth.  
Figure 7 illustrates how testing the joint significance of variables and the results of 
removing even the most insignificant factors in terms of t-statistic is difficult. Because ChildTol, 
JobsToCitizens, and GFCFGDP9815 lead to the lowest t-statistics among exogenous factors in 
equation 3a and as illustrated in Figure 1, I test their combined role in the equation. The resulting 
Stata output statistics, where the p-value restricts one from rejecting the null hypothesis, prevents 
a clear conclusion on whether they are or are not important factors up to this point in the study. 
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 Because of insignificance, the inability to account for country-specific characteristics, 
and the time comparison nature of the study, I continue by implementing additional data. I 
construct a panel data set to take into consideration fixed effects using WVS results from waves 
three and five and reexamine survey and control variables gathered for the cross-sectional data 
set used above. 
Methodology: Panel One 
As Inglehart and Baker note in their study, “different societies follow different 
trajectories even when they are subjected to the same forces of economic development, in part 
because situation-specific factors” (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Therefore, the following panel 
data set construction and analysis controls for nuances held by each post-communist European 
nation. In gathering data for a panel data set, the number of countries used in the analysis had to 
decrease. Because of inconsistencies in which countries were surveyed and which questions were 
asked during wave five compared to wave three, the panel data set shrinks to ten countries, less 
than half of the original cross section. Figure 8 shows the countries left available for a fixed 
effects panel study as well as the WVS variables and lagged GDP control factor associated with 
each country and wave. 
In constructing the output variable, GDP per capita, the two waves require different 
calculations in order to capture how the countries’ economies compare over the post-communism 
period. Equations 5 and 6 below illustrate these computations. I also calculate the average annual 
GDP per capita growth by dividing equation 5 by eleven and equation 6 by six in order to control 
for the fact that one period is almost twice as long as the other. Through the variable 
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 AvgAnnualGDP, each term in the panel for GDP per capita will be standardized and more 
comparable. 
 
5) Wave 3: ogGDP  log(GDP  per Capita 2009) log(GDP  per Capita 1998)l =  −   
6) Wave 5: ogGDP  log(GDP  per Capita 2015) log(GDP  per Capita 2009)l =  −   
 
Similar recalculations had to be done for gross fixed capital formation since these values 
must be an accumulation over two time periods rather than numbers directly coming from the 
World Bank Databank or other data set. Therefore, the equations below illustrate how the time 
period being studied is captured through GFCF across wave three and wave five. Although this 
variable does not prove to be as significant as anticipated in the first cross section, I analyzes it 
with a two-part time perspective to determine whether or not it provides any additional support 
for the hypotheses. Furthermore, like my outcome variable, GDP per capita, I divide equations 7 
and 8 by eleven and six, respectively, to produce average annual accumulation of gross fixed 
capital formation, AvgAnnualGFCF. 
 
7) ave 3 (1995 998) F CFW − 1 = ∑
2009
t=1999
G t   
8) ave 5 (2005 009) F CFW − 2 = ∑
2015
t=2010
G t  
 
The final edits made to variable data include additional GDP per capita information. The 
variable log(laggedGDP) represents the logged values for GDP per capita when surveys are 
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 collected. This means that for panel observations from wave three, log(laggedGDP) is the GDP 
per capita in 1998 while panel observations from wave five would use the GDP per capita from 
2009. This would ensure that the model accounts for the state of the economy when individuals 
made decisions regarding the survey questions. 
With the new endogenous and exogenous GDP per capita values, GFCF values for each 
country in each wave, and survey-based data for a narrowed selection of independent variables, I 
run new regressions controlling for country-specific fixed effects with each trial containing one 
or no more than two exogenous variables. 
The chief equation I analyzes, equation 9, looks specifically at Attitude with fixed 
effects: 
9) logGDP = α​i ​+ 𝛃 ​1​(Attitude) + 𝜺 
This enables me to look at how wave three and wave five survey results change over time 
and then affect GDP per capita in the ten post-communist countries. Additionally, doing this 
regression with the log of lagged GDP per capita values as a control is done as a check since 
previous GDP per capita in these nations has consistently been a significant exogenous factor in 
this study. The following section illustrates the outcomes of these trials. 
Results and Discussion: Panel One 
The variable of greatest interest in this section is once again Attitude and the results of 
this first panel data regression can be seen in Figure 9. According to the Stata output coefficient, 
as a nation’s citizens’ positive attitudes towards foreigners increased during the 1998 to 2015 
period, the country’s GDP per capita grew at a slower rate. This result is reassuring because it 
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 matches the output from the cross section data previously discussed. What is most surprising 
upon initial review of these results, however, is that the t-statistic decreases from -2.43 to -0.68. 
While this drop was unanticipated, it is reasonable to believe that the change is largely because 
of the greatly reduced sample size. By reducing the number of countries from twenty-two to ten, 
the results lose robustness.  
When changing the outcome variable from the GDP per capita for the general time period 
of each wave for each country to the average annual GDP per capita, the coefficient naturally 
remains negative, which is consistent. Additionally, I find that the effect on average annual GDP 
growth from a one standard deviation change in Attitudes results in a substantial 79.83 basis 
point decrease (or roughly 0.8% decrease). This result is much higher than the same calculation 
done following in the initial cross section, which leads me to conclude that not only is the panel 
data strong evidence, but the overall trend of more positive attitudes leading to comparatively 
slower growth is viable and significant. 
Another regression tested includes both Attitude and the log of GDP per capita from the 
beginning of each wave. In this regression, log(laggedGDP) serves as a control and tests how the 
panel’s fixed effects model runs regarding survey data alongside quantitative data. As seen in 
Figure 11, Attitude is again insignificant in terms of p-value and t-statistic. However, the 
coefficient on Attitude remains negative, which is consistent with the previous cross section 
results. Interestingly, in the fixed effects model, the log of lagged GDP per capita shows results 
that are far more significant than the others thus far seen in this study: all else equal, higher GDP 
per capita at the time survey results/waves are completed correlates with GDP per capita 
increasing faster throughout the beginning of the 21st century, which was a time of heavy 
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 rebuilding in the post-communist region in Central and Eastern Europe. Again, when using 
AvgAnnualGDP for the endogenous variable, the results become slightly stronger in terms of 
attitudes being influential and significant, which is illustrated in Figure 10. When this change to 
the dependant variable was made while using the log(laggedGDP) control, the control’s 
t-statistic decreased by almost half, which I interpret as previous economic statuses become 
relatively less influential than attitudes regarding economic growth when considering average 
year-to-year changes (Figure 12). However, the yearly effect of attitudes on GDP per capita 
while implementing lagged GDP as a control is still a notable 0.2% decrease, or 20 basis point 
decrease. Returning to the results for Attitude, the mixture of consistency and statistically 
irrelevant information leads me to turn to additional fixed effects trials.  
Just as the independent variable Attitude reacted differently in the panel than anticipated, 
so did War, the survey variable that represents how many participants responded “yes” to 
whether or not they would fight for their country. In the original cross-sectional analysis, this 
variable was highly insignificant and removed from the core group of variables. However, now 
that a panel data set is utilized, country-specific factors are taken into account, and time is more 
carefully considered, War is greatly significant. Figure 13 demonstrates how instrumental War is 
to GDP per capita in this model. Here, one can interpret the results as all else being equal, when 
more citizens express being willing to fight for their country, GDP per capita grows faster 
compared to other European countries in transition. Intuitively this make sense because engaging 
in war requires supplies, so being inclined to go to war would make a nation inclined to being 
more productive. In relation to attitudes concerning foreign people, being more willing to fight in 
war means accepting the fact that one’s fellow citizens are attacking others. Therefore, a 
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 willingness to harm others precipitates greater economic growth, setting aside opinions that this 
outcome has troubling moral, ethical, and political implications. 
Because War is not significant in the cross-section results reviewed earlier, but highly 
significant in the panel data, this study looks at each survey variable’s results in regressions 
using the panel’s fixed effects model. Figure 14 below summarizes these findings. By looking at 
all of the fixed effects regressions for the panel, one can easily compare the coefficients as well 
as the t-statistics directly below in parentheses. Here, it is clear how much more significant, in 
terms of t-statistics, War is compared to the other survey variables. While the survey variable 
representing how respondents feel about an open immigration policy, ImmPolicy, is the next 
most significant, it pales in comparison and does not serve as a strong case for immigration 
policy being a crucial casual factor. However, because the variable Attitude is comprised of 
ImmPolicy and Neighbor, having ImmPolicy be the second most significant variable in this 
comprehensive table supports the importance of looking at the effects of beliefs and values on 
economic outcomes. As a final component to this study’s statistical analysis, we return to 
cross-sectional data.  
Methodology: Cross Section Two 
To see how the decrease in observations affects the cross-sectional data I use in the initial 
statistical review, the original cross section of countries was reduced to match the group used in 
the panel data set. Now, rather than twenty-two observations, I limit the study to ten nations.  
The same six exogenous variables used in the first cross-sectional analysis are used in a 
regression for this investigation of how attitudes towards immigration affect growth in today’s 
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 Central and Eastern European countries in transition. Following this regression, the results were 
used to determine how to narrow the series of variables in order to limit the likelihood of 
multicollinearity, increased error, and weak output statistics. 
Results and Discussion: Cross Section Two 
As the panel regression results demonstrate, regression results that use a limited number 
of observations lack power in the coefficients as well as t-statistics. Having only ten observations 
greatly restricts the amount of meaningful information and trustworthy results concerning 
causality that can be gained from statistical data. Here, the data are not very powerful, but they 
are still advantageous to my research question. 
Similar to how Zak and Knack (2001) show how robustness and the power of results 
increases as sample size increases when adding countries to the set of observations by Knack and 
Keefer (1997), this study on attitudes towards immigration highlights the same effect in the 
opposite direction. Here, significance for the main variable Attitude decreases as the number of 
observations decreases. However, the results of the Stata outputs still add to this study as can be 
confirmed by a second round of cross-sectional evaluation of data. 
Compared to the independent variables analyzed in the first cross section, none proved to 
be significant according to the t-statistic and p-value. Additionally, the adjusted R-squared value 
greatly decreases - so much so that it shows the regression holding very little value at all. Figure 
15 below lays out the full Stata output for this first regression using countries identical to those 
in the panel data set.  
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 The lack of causality rooted in the exogenous variables is not surprising since the panel 
data results are also not robust. To further explore the data, I run another regression using fewer 
left-hand side variables. The selection of these variables matches the initial cross section and 
stems from choosing those that highlight attitudes towards immigration (namely, Attitude), have 
been previously significant (logGDP1998), are of interest given a holistic view of current 
literature and reflections on present-day international affairs, and continue to be significant given 
multiple rounds of testing. While other combinations of variables may provide equally 
significant results on paper, the output table, Figure 16, provides a set of results that mirrors and 
reinforces earlier analyses. 
The coefficient Attitude is particularly telling in this regression that uses a narrowed pool 
of exogenous variables. By taking a close look at similarities between Stata output tables, one 
sees that the Attitude coefficient -0.0178878 in this most recent regression (Figure 16) nearly 
matches that of the Attitude coefficient -0.0172897 in the panel regression (Figure 9). This 
illustrates that while the output data are not particularly powerful, the results are valid and do 
affirm the interpretation that citizens’ attitudes towards immigration affect a nation’s economic 
growth.  
Furthermore, I again use the average annual growth rates for the dependant variable and 
gross fixed capital formation. Figures 17 and 18 show the results that use the same regression 
terms as previous trials. Like earlier outputs, the results illustrate a justifiable connection 
between attitudes and growth, which validates my results. This time, the effect on average annual 
GDP growth from a one standard deviation change in Attitudes results in a substantial 85.23 
basis point decrease (or roughly 0.85% decrease). Looking again at the coefficients in Figure 18 
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 and the panel’s Attitude result, a simple comparison for regressions with AvgAnnualGDP 
outcomes as the endogenous factor shows the values are still comparable: -0.0017363 and 
-0.0016262.  
Again, logGDP1998 is a significant variable while once more validating convergence 
among transitioning nations’ economies. I implement this left-hand side variable as a control 
factor among opinion-based survey data and it remains important for isolating factors and 
explaining economic growth as a whole. Additionally, despite the possibility of GFCF being an 
interesting control variable to investigate, Figure 16 illustrates that in terms of the 1998 to 2015 
time period, this exogenous variable is nonessential.  
Therefore the null hypothesis that on average, there is no effect between post-communist 
European countries’ growth since the end of the 20th century and the attitudes of each countries’ 
native population towards migrants and foreign workers cannot be rejected. 
Survey and Political Limitations 
One cannot look at these outputs without also accounting for some basic assumptions. 
First, survey responses are subjective. Individuals completed the surveys themselves and there is 
no telling how many may have lied or misreported their true beliefs. Whether inaccurate survey 
responses were by accident as people think they are more or less open that they truly are, or on 
purpose, misrepresentations most likely exist among the thousands of survey responses included 
in this study.  
Second, the study does not fully account for the fact that Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, and countries in the Balkan peninsula (particularly in Bosnia, but also in Croatia and 
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 Serbia) were still imbedded in violent conflict after the dissolution of communist-party 
governments (Hall 2010). Furthermore, UN forces were sent to Macedonia amidst conflicting 
ownership claims of the area with Greece (Hall 2010). Because of these many conflicts, the 
countries’ ability to build gross fixed capital formation would have been greatly diminished in 
the last decade of the 20th century and very beginning of the 21st century, which may explain 
why the regression results for gross fixed capital formation were ultimately less influential than 
originally anticipated.  
A third assumption is that the estimates for Montenegro in particular are accurate. 
Despite the fact that Yugoslavia dissolved many years ago, Montenegro and Serbia remained 
part of a state union until May of 2006 (Djurović 2009). The two states were designed to be 
equal in their partnership, both send ministers to a joint assembly, and coordinate a common 
market between each territory (Fraser 2003). However, the two states were joined under the 
Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro and held one collective seat at the United 
Nations (Fraser 2003), so the way in which data was collected from each state prior to 2006 is 
not made unquestionably clear in the databases used for data. Nevertheless, because the two 
states had their own ministers and departments, one can see how surveys and economic analyses 
could be conducted separately, though the exact methods are not lucid. Therefore, this study 
assumes that the state union’s data collection was conducted accurately and separately within 
each state despite the inability to confirm such accuracy.  
Lastly, Germany was not included in this study, but it provides an interesting case study 
for openness and economic growth. The history of Germany being divided then reunited during a 
time of animosity and unrest as well as West and East Germany once following different 
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 economic systems illustrate how attitudes and economies are interconnected. Surprisingly, the 
World Value Survey provides survey data for East and West Germany as separate entities for 
wave three, and the results are illustrated below in Figures 19 and 20. However, this is the only 
period that includes these governments and therefore no comparison regarding attitudes can be 
made over time.  
What one can learn from the survey data on East and West Germany is that the people of 
West Germany had more open attitudes towards immigration across all variables. At the same 
time, if one separates GDP per capita in West and East Germany after unification, West 
Germany maintains a stronger economy as East Germany catches up (CEIC Data 2018). 
According to CEIC (2018), even when excluding Berlin from West Germany GDP per capita 
data and including Berlin in East Germany data, West Germany surpasses East Germany’s GDP 
per capita by over ten thousand Euros.  
These results offer a counterpoint to this study, which may be attributed to the fact that 
Germany is widely considered a Western country. Therefore, one can conclude that while my 
study finds that negative attitudes towards immigration are connected to stronger GDP per capita 
growth in a country, this may only hold true for nations that are non-Western and still 
transitioning. How attitudes concerning immigrants in fully developed countries is related to 
economic growth may depict more open-minded results and conclusions that reflect the current 
literature on values and prosperity. 
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 Conclusion 
The importance of studying differences in economic growth among post-communist 
nations cannot be understated. These countries in transition have provided and will continue to 
provide information on how states and nations develop after substantial governmental and 
societal changes, which can be used as precedents for development in other countries.  
This study in particular looks at how attitudes towards immigration affect GDP per capita 
while also controlling for non-personal value variables. Specifically, the research focuses on 
rejecting or not rejecting the null hypothesis that on average, there is no effect between 
post-communist European countries’ growth since the end of the 20th century and the attitudes 
of each countries’ native population towards migrants and foreign workers. In terms of 
significant explanatory variables, Neighbor, individuals who did not answer that they prefer not 
to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors, and ImmPolicy, individuals who answered 
that they believe the government should allow anyone to enter their country who wants to enter, 
combine to create Attitude as the most significant WVS variable. For non-survey control 
variables, the log of GDP per capita in 1998 is consistently the most significant as shown by its 
dependably high t-statistic, whereas GFCF could not be relied on as a factor perhaps due to the 
tumultuous political and military scene in Eastern Europe during the period of interest. 
Nevertheless, regression outputs demonstrate that there are noteworthy effects of attitudes on 
GDP per capita, and according to these results, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that on 
average, there is no effect between post-communist European countries’ growth since the end of 
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 the 20th century and the attitudes of each countries’ native population towards migrants and 
foreign workers. 
By coming to this conclusion, the study supports current literature because it also finds 
that personal values are significant when analyzing growth, and it also adds to the literature by 
showing that immigration attitudes make a difference. Furthermore, the study narrows in on the 
post-communist area, compared to Inglehart and Baker (2000) who look at countries on multiple 
continents, while expanding upon case study research on Estonia and Latvia by Titma and 
Trapido (2002). Moving forward, additional research would be beneficial since existing literature 
is contradictory. If other studies were able to access data that could be used to expand a cross 
sectional analysis and panel data set similar to the one I use in my research as well as be able to 
track country responses consistently over a longer period of time, more conclusive evidence on 
causality may result.  
Additionally, while it is outside the scope of this paper, research on how immigration 
policies actually implemented affect economic growth in the European post-communist region 
would provide valuable information as well. A difference-in-difference model would be 
enlightening in terms of such policy implications for countries that have undergone major 
political changes since separating from communist regimes. Here, we analyzed opinions on 
immigration policy, but investigating how beliefs become actions and actions become 
implications may strongly influence the ways in which individual citizens think about others. 
Returning to Inglehart and Baker’s paper, which heavily motivated this study, the authors 
determine that industrialization leads to survivalist and self-expressionist values, which are 
correlated with trust and tolerance, and leads to higher GNP per capita (2000). Their work looks 
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 at how cultural shifts correspond with simultaneously measured beliefs and economic outcomes. 
The difference in their results versus mine may reflect the time factor and emphasis on trust 
rather than immigration in my study. Inglehart and Baker use survey data from 1990-1991 and 
1995-1998 as well as GNP per capita data from 1995 Purchasing Power Parity analyses gathered 
by the World Bank (Inglehart and Baker 2000). I, on the other hand, use similar 1995-1998 
survey data, but also incorporate 21st century survey results and use the responses as forecasts 
for how these attitudes predict future growth up to 2015. Additionally, I focus on immigration 
and foreign workers whereas Baker and Inglehart analyze trust and other broad cultural values. 
This difference in data usage helps to explain my results’ deviance from existing literature and 
supports continuation of similar and supplemental research. 
Determining the consequences of values regarding immigration is particularly important 
today as opinions become increasingly polarizing. Using this research in conjunction with 
analyses on social norms could influence individual perspectives on immigrants and foreigners 
as national and international discourses develop. Although this study indicates that being more 
closed off towards others leads to greater growth, it motivates additional research into how to 
achieve both welcoming values and economic prosperity. 
 
 
 
 
37 
 References 
Beugelsdijk, Sjoerd; de Groot, Henri L.F., and Anton B.T.M. van Schaik. 2004. “Trust and 
Economic Growth: A Robustness Analysis.” ​Oxford Economic Papers​ 56 (1): 118-34. 
CEIC Data. 2018. ​Germany GDP per Capita: West Germany excl Berlin​. New York, NY. 
Accessed April 2, 2019. Available at: 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/germany/esa-2010-gdp-per-capita-by-region/gdp-per-capita
-west-germany-excl-berlin. 
Dancygier, Rafaela M., and Michael J. Donnelly. 2012. "Sectoral Economies, Economic 
Contexts, and Attitudes toward Immigration." ​The Journal of Politics​ 75 (1): 17-35. 
Djurović, Gordana. 2009. “Montenegro's Strategic Priorities on the Path of Euro-Atlantic 
Integration.” ​Connections,​ ​9​, no. 1 (Winter): 93-112.  
Durr, Jean-Michael. 2018. World Statistics: International Migrant Stock (% of population). 
Accessed October 17, 2018. 
Fidrmuc, Jan. 2001. “Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth During Post-Communist 
Transition” ​William Davidson Institute​. 
Fraser, John. 2003. “Serbia and Montenegro: How Much Sovereignty? What Kind of 
Association?” ​International Journal ​58, no. 2 (Spring): 373-388. 
Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. ​Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity.​ New York: 
Free Press. 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2009. "Cultural Biases in Economic 
Exchange?" ​The Quarterly Journal of Economics ​124 (3): 1095-131. 
38 
 Hall, Richard. 2010. “BALKAN WARS, 1991–2001.” In ​Consumed by War: European Conflict 
in the 20th Century​, 226-242. University Press of Kentucky. 
Inglehart, Ronald, and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the 
Persistence of Traditional Values." ​American 
Sociological Review​ 65 (1): 19-51. 
Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. 
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: All Rounds - 
Country-Pooled Datafile Version: 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV3.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems 
Institute. 
Katchanovski, Ivan. 2000. "Divergence in Growth in Post-Communist Countries." ​Journal of 
Public Policy​ 20 (1): 55-81. 
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A 
Cross-Country Investigation." ​The Quarterly Journal of Economics​ 112 (4): 1251-288. 
Kubin, Ingrid, and Peter Rosner. 2002. "Immigration, Growth, and Distribution." ​Jahrbuch Für 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Review of Economics​ 53 (1): 32-52. 
Lane, Philip R.and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. 2007. "The external wealth of nations mark II: 
Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970–2004." ​Journal of 
International Economics​ 73 (November): 223-250. 
Ma, Shu-Yun. 1998. "Third World Studies, Development Studies and Post-Communist Studies: 
Definitions, Distance and Dynamism." ​Third World Quarterly​ 19, no. 3 (September): 
339-56.  
39 
 NationMaster. Economy > Gross fixed capital formation > Current US$ > Per $ GDP: Countries 
Compared. Accessed October 27, 2018. Available at: 
http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Economy/Gross-fixed-capital-formation/
Current-US%24/Per-%24-GDP. 
Quispe-Agnoli, Myriam, and Madeline Zavodny. 2002. “The Effect of Immigration on Output 
Mix, Capital, and Productivity.” ​Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta​ 87 
(1): 1-11. 
Titma, Mikk, and Denis Trapido. 2002. "Predictions of Success in Post-Communist Societies: 
Evidence from Latvia and Estonia.” ​Society And Economy​ 24 (3): 297-331. 
United Nations Development Programme. 2018. ​Human Development Reports​, Mean year of 
schooling (years). 
United Nations Statistics Division. 2018.​ National Accounts Main Aggregates​, Per capita GDP at 
current prices - US dollars. 
United Nations Statistics Division. 2018. “Methodology for the National Accounts Main 
Aggregates Database.” Accessed October 26, 2018. Available at: 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/methodology.pdf.  
World Bank. 2018. “World Development Indicators.” 
World Bank. 2018. “Population Estimates and Projections.” 
Zak, Paul J., and Stephen Knack. 2001. "Trust and Growth." ​The Economic Journal​ 111 (470): 
295-321. 
40 
 Appendix 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. 
 
41 
  
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 4.  
 
42 
 Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 6. 
 
 
43 
 Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 8.  
Wave Country Log 
GDP 
Avg 
Annual 
GDP 
Child 
Tol 
Trust -Neig
hbor 
Im
mP
olic
y 
Attit
ude 
JobsTo
Citizen
s 
War GFCF 
sum 
AvgAnnualGFC
F 
Log 
(lagged 
GDP) 
3 Bulgaria 0.5933 0.05393 46.4 23.7 84.4 5.8 45.1 79.6 55 82032469765 7457497251 3.258 
3 Georgia 0.5265 0.04786 54.1 17.7 89.1 15.6 52.4 80.9 65.1 16485157625 1498650693 2.906 
3 Hungary 0.4382 0.03984 63.5 22.5 75.1 1.2 38.2 86.5 61.8 2.52608E+11 22964363636 3.677 
3 Moldova 0.5314 0.04831 63.4 21.8 86.8 11.6 49.2 58.1 72 8342005959 758364178.1 2.668 
3 Poland 0.4075 0.03705 81.5 16.9 79 5.7 42.4 88.3 72.2 6.85122E+11 62283818182 3.654 
3 Romania 0.6574 0.05977 72.1 17.9 67.2 9.3 38.3 71.8 70.5 3.05066E+11 27733272727 3.271 
3 Russia 0.6690 0.06082 69.5 23.2 88.1 6.2 47.2 70.5 68.9 1.6105E+12 1.46409E+11 3.264 
3 Serbia 0.3819 0.03472 50.2 28.4 76.1 19.1 47.6 78.9 70.8 59462918055 5405719823 3.383 
3 Slovenia 0.3437 0.03124 72 15.3 82 2.9 42.5 79.6 81.9 1.02893E+11 9353909091 4.048 
3 Ukraine 0.4839 0.04399 61.2 28.8 87.5 18.2 52.9 56.4 59.4 1.96422E+11 17856545455 2.922 
5 Bulgaria 0.001489 0.0002482 53 19.6 82.4 11.7 47.1 74.4 38.5 69021142968 11503523828 3.843 
5 Georgia 0.1433 0.02388 72.1 17.6 76.1 8.3 42.2 85.4 56.5 21219621341 3536603557 3.432 
5 Hungary -0.01859 -0.003098 76.1 28.7 76.1 4.4 40.3 76.6 45.3 1.65039E+11 27506500000 4.115 
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 5 Moldova 0.07962 0.01327 66.5 17.6 81.2 12.7 47 75.1 57.4 10045778704 1674296451 3.183 
5 Poland 0.03748 0.0062459 84.9 18.1 86.3 11.8 49.1 78.6 64.9 6.0764E+11 1.01273E+11 4.062 
5 Romania 0.02507 0.004178 58.6 19.3 83.7 21.7 52.7 61.1 56.6 2.80142E+11 46690333333 3.928 
5 Russia 0.03723 0.006205 68.6 24.6 68.1 - - 78.8 60.3 2.46364E+12 4.10607E+11 3.933 
5 Serbia -0.04591 -0.007652 63.9 13.6 75.6 12.8 44.2 43.9 48.2 46302249833 7717041639 3.765 
5 Slovenia -0.07194 -0.01199 75 17.5 82.4 6.8 44.6 72.7 60.2 56821071290 9470178548 4.392 
5 Ukraine -0.07847 -0.013079 56.1 24.5 81.4 19.1 50.3 67 56.4 1.47463E+11 24577166667 3.406 
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 Figure 20. World Value Survey Results for West Germany and East Germany during wave three 
 
 West Germany East Germany 
ChildTol 90.9 % 85.7 % 
Trust 39.9 % 24.3 % 
Attitude 54.55 % 48.9 % 
JobsToCitizens 42.3 % 70.4 % 
War 41.9 % 44 % 
ImmLikedLeast 1.2 % 1.4 % 
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